

**Improving Taiwan's Military Capabilities,
C4ISR Integration**

By

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INTRODUCTION

President Barack Obama recently said that the relationship between the US and China will shape the 21st Century¹, reflecting the great importance the United States places on good relations with China and the two country's growing economic interdependence. Since he took office, President Ma Ying-jeou has made improving Taiwan-China relations a top priority, reflecting the great importance Taiwan places on good relations with China. In this environment, the specter of war in the Taiwan Strait seems increasingly remote. Still, China's aggressive buildup of its military forces along the Taiwan Strait continues, and the prospects for reunification, much less reconciliation, remain an unknown distance over the horizon.

In this context, President Obama will travel to China this November seeking to harmonize US and PRC policy on a broad spectrum of political, economic, and military issues. In preparation for his meetings with Chinese leaders, US policy officials are conducting a review of US China and Taiwan policies. The nagging issue of US arms sales to Taiwan, of course, looms large in that review. As Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell indicated in his confirmation hearings, the challenge for the US is to facilitate the best environment that is conducive to Taiwan's continuing peaceful engagement with China while providing Taiwan with suitable defensive weapons that afford it the confidence of US support in its interactions with China.² How the Obama administration plans to implement this strategy remains unclear.

As has always been the case, there is much debate within the US government about what constitutes "suitable" defensive weapons and in what quantities the US should provide them. China will argue, as will some in the United States, it's time to adhere to a strict interpretation of the August 1982 Communiqué, which has never been strictly interpreted in the 27 years that it has been in existence. Since April 2001, the US government has largely ignored it. Nevertheless, China attaches great importance to the communiqué and no doubt will remind President Obama of the commitment made when the US government signed it.

"Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce

gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue."³

China, as it pursues a better relationship with the United States, may even try to convince President Obama, as it tried to convince President George W. Bush, that the time has come for a new communiqué—one which commits the US to even greater reductions or even a moratorium in arms sales to Taiwan. Chinese leaders, who have interpreted the slow down in US arms sales to Taiwan in recent years at least in part as a response to their frequent demarches, will continue to press what they believe has been a winning strategy.

Indeed, for a variety of reasons, major US arms sales to Taiwan have dramatically slowed in recent years. In October 2008, after a long delay, the Bush administration notified to Congress of only half of the \$12 billion in sales pending at the State Department just prior to President Bush leaving office. No arms sales to Taiwan have been notified since President Obama took office nine months ago.

Nevertheless, the US remains bound by the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act⁴ (TRA) as long as China maintains an array of forces and ballistic missiles along the Taiwan Strait that threaten Taiwan. Sooner or later, we have to assume, the Obama administration will notify the sale of Blackhawk helicopters and additional Patriot PAC-3 missiles the Bush administration held back. It's unclear when or if the Obama administration will permit Taiwan to submit a letter of request (LOR) for 66 new F-16C/D fighters. Taiwan cannot maintain a minimal air-defense capability in the coming years without them. The US and Taiwan positions on diesel-electric submarines remain unclear. The Bush administration held back a notification on the design phase for an FMS program to provide Taiwan with submarines; now Taiwan appears ready to pursue a domestic submarine program with or without US assistance.

The purpose of this paper, however, is not to make the compelling arguments that continued US arms sales to Taiwan are necessary and that the Obama administration should move expeditiously to notify Congress of pending and other sales. The Council does that clearly and effectively, and I strongly support their efforts. Nor is it to deny the necessity and

desirability of both the US and Taiwan pursuing better relations with China. I strongly support those efforts as well. My purpose here is to address how Taiwan can make best use of the equipment and military capabilities it currently possesses and those it may acquire in the future.

Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) improvements are absolutely necessary to the defense of Taiwan and deterrence of any attempts by China to reunite Taiwan with the Mainland by coercion or military force. As unlikely as that may appear at present, China has never rejected the use of force to resolve the "Taiwan issue" and has never been shy about using military force to achieve political ends.

Taiwan has made great strides in C4ISR over the past decade and deserves credit for what they have accomplished. The Po Sheng ("Broad Victory") program, Taiwan's principal C4ISR effort, is providing Taiwan with significant C4ISR capabilities. Much remains to be done, however, to achieve an optimum level of joint C4ISR integration and continued US assistance is critical to achieving that goal.

I want to stress emphatically that nothing contained in this paper is a substitute for the continued sale of major new weapons sales to Taiwan. Taiwan's relative military capabilities *vis-à-vis* China will only continue to deteriorate unless the US continues to supply Taiwan with the weapons it needs.

FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

First, as the paragraph below from the Department of Defense 2009 China Military Power Report states, the relative military balance in the Taiwan Strait continues to shift in China's favor. This is a long-term trend begun when the China decided to stop relying solely on the indigenous development and production of weapons systems and began buying fighter aircraft and other major weapon systems from Russia and other countries. Growth in PRC defense spending continues at robust pace and improvements in China's military capabilities have been impressive.

“Shifting Dynamics in the Taiwan Strait. Since 2000, there have been two peaceful political transitions on Taiwan and a gradual and steady maturation of Taiwan democracy. While Beijing's strategy toward Taiwan appears to have shifted from seeking an early resolution of the Taiwan issue to one of preventing Taiwan's *de jure* independence, by force if necessary, Beijing's objective of unifying Taiwan with the Mainland has not changed. Since 2000, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has continued to shift in Beijing's favor, marked by the sustained deployment of advanced military equipment to the Military Regions opposite Taiwan. In the 2002 report, the Department of Defense assessed that Taiwan 'has enjoyed dominance of the airspace over the Taiwan Strait for many years.' This conclusion no longer holds true. With this reversal, China has been able to develop a range of limited military options to attempt to coerce Taipei.”⁵

Second, differences between the US and Taiwan during the George W. Bush and Chen Shui-Bien administrations inhibited US arms sales to Taiwan and improvements in Taiwan's military capabilities. In April 2001, President Bush approved in principle approximately \$35 billion in major US arms sales to Taiwan, including diesel-electric submarines. The election of President Chen and his pursuit of policies intended to move Taiwan in toward *de jure* independence, angered the Bush administration because it complicated its attempts to pursue better US-China relations. At the same time, the Legislative Yuan (LY) and Chen's own domestic spending priorities withheld funding for major arms sales purchases from the US. Prolonged Taiwan defense budget battles not only hindered improvements of Taiwan's military capabilities, it lessened Washington's confidence in Taiwan's commitment to its national defense.

Third, changes in the global strategic political, military, and economic environment have led to improvements in US-China relations and increased mutual US-China interdependence, further complicating US-Taiwan defense relations. Washington has relied on Beijing for assistance in attempts to negotiate with North Korea over its nuclear weapons program in the Six Party Talks. As of January 2009 China held \$739.6 billion in US treasury securities amounting to 24 percent of the US national debt.⁶ While China may be as equally dependent on the US market as we are on their foreign exchange reserves, keeping US-China relations free of friction is a major objective of the Obama administration.

Fourth, improvements in US-China and Taiwan-China relations since President Ma Ying-jeou took office have altered the traditional status quo, affecting US policy-makers'

perceptions of Taiwan's military requirements. Despite the fact that the China's military buildup in the Taiwan Strait continues, many US policy makers see Taiwan-China détente as an opportunity to reduce US arms sales to Taiwan and the irritation they have consistently been to US-China relations at a time when the US seeks improvements in its relationship with China. This is not unique to the Obama administration and was true of many Bush administration officials as well.

Fifth, as stated above, the US has not and will not abandon the core requirements of the TRA; Congress is not about to change the law and remains a bastion of strong support for Taiwan. Nevertheless, the Executive Branch has broad latitude in how it interprets and executes the TRA. Long delays in US arms sales to Taiwan during the George W. Bush administration saw only modest pressure from the US Congress. The outlook, therefore, given the current state of play in US-China-Taiwan relations for future US arms sales to Taiwan is uncertain. Simply stated, the closer US-China relations become, the more difficult it is for the US to proceed with major arms sales, and while the US commitment to the TRA is always invoked by those who advocate them, Congress, particularly a Democratic Congress, is not about to hold hearings or put pressure on a Democratic president on Taiwan policy.

Sixth, as the Council's Second Quarter 2009 Defense and Security Report points out, the downturn in Taiwan's economy resulting from the current global financial crisis will have immediate and longer term impacts on Taiwan's defense budget and its defense acquisition decisions.⁷ One reason often cited by Bush administration officials for equivocating on arms sales decisions during the Chen administration was the Taiwan LY's unwillingness to appropriate adequate funds to pay for some of them. Bush administration officials did not want to approve an arms sale to Taiwan, take heat over that decision from Beijing, then discover that Taiwan was not willing follow through on the purchase. To avoid a similar reaction in the Obama administration, Taiwan must carefully prioritize its arms sales requests, press the US government firmly to approve them, and demonstrate that it will follow through with adequate funding.

Seventh, China-Taiwan "reconciliation" will not happen quickly. Despite recent improvements in Taiwan-China relations, fundamental differences between the systems of

government in China and Taiwan and lack of broad-based public support in Taiwan for near-term reconciliation will inhibit the process. Furthermore, no one should assume the gains made to date are irreversible. History never moves in a straight line.

While the above portends mostly negative trends for US arms sales to Taiwan and for improvements in Taiwan's military capabilities, the outlook is not without positive aspects.

IMPROVING TAIWAN'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Given these facts and assumptions, in order to accomplish the goals of its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published in March of this year, Taiwan must make the best use of the equipment and forces it currently possesses to improve Taiwan's overall military capabilities. The best way it can do that is to improve its overall C4ISR capability, integration, and training. Taiwan's current military capabilities, although lagging behind what's necessary to keep pace with aggressively expanding PRC military buildup, are not insubstantial. The Taiwan armed forces are a highly professional, dedicated, and capable military force. Robust, comprehensive, and fully integrated C4ISR is a force multiplier that will enable Taiwan to use the equipment and forces it has to maximum advantage. While this is not substitute for the weapons and defense systems Taiwan needs, it is nonetheless critical to Taiwan's ability to maintain a strong defense as it pursues détente with China.

Like all military forces, Taiwan must struggle with budgets and priorities and make decisions based on complex political, military, and economic factors. Unlike most militaries, Taiwan has the additional burden of almost total dependence on the United States. It is only able to acquire those major weapon systems the US is willing to sell it or that it can develop and manufacture domestically. Even indigenous projects, like the Indigenous Defensive Fighter (IDF) were largely dependent on US assistance. The military capabilities, therefore, that Taiwan seeks to achieve are dependent on US acquiescence and assistance.

There has been much discussion and debate over the years between Washington and Taipei about which military capabilities the US should assist Taiwan in pursuing. There are various ways to define and categorize military capabilities. Those listed in Taiwan's QDR, however, are ones the US and Taiwan can agree on and that the US can and should support.

For the purposes of this paper, they are the ones better C4ISR integration and training are intended to improve.

Taiwan's 2009 QDR Joint Operations Capabilities:

- C4ISR (integrated command and control, real-time communications, precise intelligence and surveillance)
- Information Ops-Electronic Warfare (early warning, rapid response)
- Counter Air (long range precision engagement, joint multilayer interception)
- Sea Control (rapid deployment and long range strike)
- Ground Defense (information-technology based, multi-dimensional, mechanized)
- Asymmetrical Warfare (strike enemies weak points to overcome its advantages)
- Reserve Mobilization (on-site and timely mobilization and engagement)
- Combined Logistics (precise logistical mgt and rapid logistical support)
- Intangible Combat (national identity, integrity, virtue, discipline solidarity, determination, and all out defense)

Although C4ISR is listed as a separate capability, it is integral to each of them except "intangible combat." To be effective in each of these areas requires a near real-time common tactical picture, accurate and timely information, situational awareness, unit-sensor-weapon integration, and automation to allow commanders and national-level decision makers to make timely and effective decisions. C4ISR, therefore, is both a capability in itself and an integral part Taiwan's other capabilities.

US-TAIWAN C4ISR HISTORY

Taiwan has made great progress in C4ISR since the US Navy's Space and Naval Warfare System Command's (SPAWAR) advanced tactical data link system (TADLS) study in December, 2001, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's (DSCA) August, 2002, C4ISR architecture study. Those two joint US-Taiwan efforts established the baseline for Taiwan's Po Sheng⁸ program and for its C4ISR efforts to date. They were a direct result of the great importance the US and Taiwan place on Taiwan's C4ISR development at the end of the

Clinton and the beginning of George W. Bush administration. C4ISR was a principal focal point of the US-Taiwan defense dialogue during those years. The US considered C4ISR to be Taiwan's highest defense priority.

The Taiwan-funded \$6 million C4ISR architecture study was supervised by DSCA and conducted by the MITRE Corporation via an FMS case. That study produced recommendations for a comprehensive C4ISR plan, tailored to Taiwan's unique requirements, and was intended to be the blue print for a Taiwan C4ISR acquisition strategy. DoD also recommended to MND that they form a bilateral executive steering committee (ESC) to assist Taiwan with its C4ISR planning and acquisition. Modest additional funding was required to provide contractor technical advice to the ESC.

In 2002, budget battles between the LY and the Chien Shui-bian administration over defense spending resulted in the LY's insistence that MND merge its data-link and C4ISR programs within data-link program budget. That meant no funding for MITRE and ESC. Subsequent Taiwan defense budgets increased Po Sheng funding, but by then Taiwan's inability to fund other major programs approved by President Bush in April 2001 overshadowed C4ISR as a central focus of DoD-MND dialogue. Taiwan's request for eight diesel-electric submarines, Patriot PAC-3 missiles, P-3s, Apache helicopters, and other systems and its inability to fund them dominated the relationship. Chen Shui-bian's strident Taiwan independence activities further complicated the US-Taiwan relationship.

As a result, Taiwan's Po Sheng C4ISR program became an ongoing "approved program" with only marginal oversight and direction from DoD policy offices. While everyone involved in program execution on both the US and Taiwan sides have made Po Sheng a successful program, I do not believe it has achieved what it otherwise would have achieved with high-level US policy oversight and support. Specifically, Po Sheng has been underfunded. Numerous platforms remain outside the Po Sheng program of record and it does not provide the command and control capabilities Taiwan needs for effective ballistic missile defense and anti-submarine warfare. Had US policy makers placed greater emphasis on C4ISR and worked more closely with MND, increased funding from the LY and the needed technical assistance from the US might have been obtained to address these issues.

PO SHENG:

The Po Sheng, as it currently exists, provides Taiwan with several operational advantages. It reduces “find, fix, track, target, engage, assess” cycle time. It distributes near real-time common tactical picture. It provides commanders accurate, timely information for improved situational awareness. It maximizes unit, sensor and weapon employment. It optimizes weapon-target pairing for layered defense. And its automation increases operator efficiencies, reduces errors. As pointed out above, however, numerous platforms have not yet been equipped with data-link terminals.

Po Sheng is a world-class C4ISR transport system that networks Taiwan's “sensor—weapon” grid. Its scalable, joint-C2 system extends across the national command structure with a services oriented architecture that enables rapid technology insertion. Commonality reduces total ownership costs. It will support Taiwan's all-volunteer force manpower reduction from 275 to 215 thousand personnel. And it will enable Taiwan with confidence building measures with China.

As Taiwan-China relations and interactions improve, a robust Taiwan C4ISR system will greatly assist Taiwan in establishing a range of confidence building measures (CBMs) with China that will further reduce tensions and, hopefully, provide incentives for China to reduce its missiles and forces along the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan will have greater confidence in its own military capabilities and situational awareness in and around the Taiwan Strait. As Taiwan demonstrates this capability and confidence, it will allow Taiwan and China to take the first steps toward building traditional CBMs such as the mutual notification of exercises and movements, establishment of a “hot-line” between the two defense establishments, and eventual military exchanges. President Ma has said that a military CBM framework could only be established after conclusion of a peace agreement with China. That position could change.⁹

The bottom line is that Po Sheng gives Taiwan its first national-level joint command and control capability to deal to deal with aircraft, maritime surface and land targets. It enables

those platforms equipped with data-link terminals to share near real-time information and engage target in a timely and effective manner.

ADDITIONAL C4ISR REQUIREMENTS

While Taiwan has accomplished a great deal over the past decade, much remains to be done to achieve the optimum joint C4ISR integration. Taiwan has various options as to how it does this. It can continue to rely heavily on the US foreign military sales (FMS) system to purchase the hardware, technical assistance, and services it requires. It can rely more heavily on its own resources such as the Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST). Or it can pursue a strategy that uses a combination of the two. Of course, I can not speak for MND, but we have to wonder if the lack of high-level MND-DoD policy dialogue on C4ISR has in any way shaken Taiwan's confidence in the FMS process and the level of US assistance it receives, leading it to rely more heavily on its own institutions like CSIST.

However Taiwan proceeds, it must extend the foundation established by the Po Sheng program, integrate other assets not included in the Po Sheng program of record, and acquire new capabilities in an effective and efficient manner within the limits its defense budgets impose.

Extend Po Sheng Foundation: Again, many of Taiwan's weapon system platforms have not yet been equipped with MIDS data-link terminals. They were not included in the original Po Sheng program because of budget limitations. These include the remaining F-16A/Bs, the E2-Ts, the La Fayette frigates, and the IDF fighters. The 58 Mirage fighters were originally funded in Po Sheng, but were later excluded. TWAN enhancements also are needed.

Integrate Other Assets: Other existing or soon to be acquired assets were never part of Po Sheng but need to be included. These are systems necessary for ballistic missile defense, sea lines of communication (SLOC) defense, and ground defense.

Integrating the new and existing Patriot missile batteries along with Taiwan's SRP early warning radar is essential if Taiwan is to have an effective ballistic missile defense system. In December 2008 the US notified the sale of three additional Patriot batteries

including PAC-3 anti-ballistic-missile missiles. While a link-16-type data link exists between the SRP and the existing Patriot batteries, the SRP must have an automatic tracking and prioritization capability and be able to pass that information to the new PAC-3-equipped Patriot fire units in order for them to effectively engage a saturation attack by PRC ballistic missiles.

Other aircraft that require MIDS data link terminals include Taiwan's soon-to-be-acquired P3-C anti-submarine warfare aircraft, its existing fleet of AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters, and the AH-64 Apache Longbow attack helicopters that will begin arriving in late 2013. The P-3Cs integrated into Taiwan's C4ISR system will greatly extend Taiwan's antisubmarine warfare capability. Integrating the Cobras and Apaches will greatly enhance Taiwan's ability to defend against and repel an amphibious invasion--significantly enhancing its overall deterrence.

Acquire New Capabilities: Future C4ISR capabilities that would greatly enhance Taiwan's overall military capability include an ASW coordination center, training/exercise reconstruction, a mobile tactical internet, land battle management, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) aircraft, satellite communications (SATCOM), and other intelligence and strategic reconnaissance (ISR) assets.

US-TAIWAN C4ISR COOPERATION

US assistance and close US-Taiwan cooperation has always been essential to Taiwan's acquisition of defensive military capabilities. It is especially essential to Taiwan's acquisition of complex, state-of-the-art C4ISR systems and capabilities. There has been a break in high-level policy dialogue on C4ISR. That dialogue needs to be resumed and strengthened.

C4ISR cooperation must be a top priority and a central topic in the US-Taiwan defense dialogue at the Defense Review Talks (DRTs), the Security Cooperation Talks (SCTs), and at the Monterey Talks. The purpose of this dialogue is to:

- Allow Taiwan to benefit from US C4ISR practical experience and knowledge.
- Help MND make better cost/benefit acquisition decisions

- Help MND define and Justify their requirements and budgets to the LY
- Allow DoD to better understand Taiwan's requirements and make the technology release decisions.
- Address the critical and sensitive areas of ballistic missile defense and ASW

To expand and enhance this dialogue, the US and Taiwan should reconsider reviving the idea of an ESC made up of appropriate senior representatives from both sides as a forum where Taiwan could seek US assistance on its C4ISR planning, acquisition, and implementation efforts.

Taiwan should submit an LOR for a US-Government led team to assess Taiwan's overall C4ISR integration and training requirements and provide price and availability for an FMS case to address those integration efforts not currently funded by existing C4ISR related programs.

Taiwan should submit an LOR for a Po Sheng follow-on program so as not to lose the C4ISR momentum it has achieved. Any concerns Taiwan may have about the FMS process should be addressed as part of its high-level dialogue with the US.

US policy-makers need to assure Taiwan that they will respond to Taiwan's request for an LOA for a Po-Sheng follow-on program in a timely manner and it will not be held hostage because of concern for China's reaction to it as other requests have been.

CONCLUSION

Four US presidential administrations from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush have demonstrated their commitment to a militarily strong Taiwan. I'm sure the Barack Obama administration will do no less. As it sorts out its policies toward China and Taiwan, however, it should not delay and making C4ISR a central issue in the US-Taiwan defense dialogue and in providing the necessary assistance and support to build on the C4ISR capabilities Taiwan already has established.

ENDNOTES

¹ BBC News, July 27, 2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8169869.stm>

² US-Taiwan Business Council, Defense and Security Report, Second Quarter 2009, p. 15.

³ Sino-US Joint Communiqué, August 17, 1982

⁴ The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979

⁵ Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China, p. VIII.

⁶ [Major Foreign holders of U.S. Treasury Securities \(2008\)](#), U.S. Treasury Department

⁷ US-Taiwan Business Council, Defense and Security Report, Second Quarter 2009, pp. 13-15.

⁸ Po Sheng ("Broad Victory") is the name Taiwan originally gave to the data-link (TADLS) program. In 2002, when Taiwan combined data-link with the Taiwan Command and Control System (TCCS) recommended in DSCA C4ISR Architecture Study, it became synonymous with Taiwan's overall C4ISR efforts.

⁹ US-Taiwan Business Council, Defense and Security Report, Second Quarter 2009, p. 10.

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FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

- **The relative military balance in the Taiwan Strait continues to shift in China's favor.**
- **Changes in the global strategic political, military, and economic environment and improvements in US-China relations have made increased mutual US-China interdependence, further complicating US-Taiwan defense relations.**
- **Improvements in US-China and Taiwan-China relations since President Ma Ying-jeou took office have altered the traditional status quo affecting some US policy-makers' perceptions of Taiwan's military requirements.**
- **The US has not and will not abandon the core requirements of the Taiwan Relations Act; however, the Executive Branch has broad latitude in how it interprets and executes the law. The process for future US arms sales to Taiwan may change due to the changing cross-Strait dynamic.**

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FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS (Cont.)

- **The downturn in Taiwan's economy will have immediate and long-term impacts on Taiwan's defense budgets and defense acquisitions.**
- **China-Taiwan "reconciliation" will not happen quickly.**

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IMPROVING TAIWAN'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES

- **Given these assumptions, Taiwan must make the best use of the equipment and forces it currently possesses to improve its overall military capabilities.**
- **Improvements in Taiwan's C4ISR capability, integration, and training are an essential force multiplier.**
- **While not a substitute for the weapons and systems Taiwan needs, C4ISR is crucial to Taiwan's ability to maintain a strong defense and pursue détente with China**
- **The capabilities that Taiwan seeks to achieve are dependent on US acquiescence and assistance.**

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TAIWAN'S 2009 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW **Joint Operations Capabilities**

- **C4ISR (integrated CC, real-time communications, precise intel/surv)**
- **Information Ops-Electronic Warfare (early warning, rapid response)**
- **Counter Air (long range precision engagement, joint multilayer interception)**
- **Sea Control (rapid deployment and long range strike)**
- **Ground Defense (IT based, multi-dimensional, mechanized)**
- **Asymmetrical Warfare (strike enemies weak points to overcome its adv)**
- **Reserve Mobilization (on-site & timely mobilization and engagement)**
- **Combined Logistics (precise logistical mgt and rapid logistical support)**
- **Intangible Combat (national identity, integrity, virtue, discipline solidarity, determination, & all out defense)**

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PO SHENG STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES

- **Networks “sensor–weapon” grid**
- **World-class C4ISR transport system**
- **Scalable, joint C2 system extends across national command structure**
- **Commonality reduces total ownership costs**
- **Supports All Volunteer Force manpower reduction from 275k to 215k**
- **Supports confidence building measures with PRC**

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ADDITIONAL C4ISR REQUIEEMENTS

- **Extend Po Sheng Foundation**
 - **Integrate remaining platforms**
- **Integrate Other Legacy Assets**
 - **IDF, Helicopters**
- **Integrate New Systems**
 - **SRP, PAC III, P-3C**
- **Acquire New Capabilities**
 - **ISR, SATCOM**

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US-TAIWAN C4ISR COOPERATION

- **Continuing OSD-MND Dialogue that focuses on:**
 - **Allowing Taiwan to benefit from US C4ISR practical experience and knowledge.**
 - **Helping MND make better cost/benefit acquisition decisions**
 - **Help MND define and justify their requirements and budgets to the LY**
 - **Allowing DoD to better understand Taiwan's requirements and make the technology release decisions.**
 - **Addressing the critical and sensitive areas of ballistic missile defense and ASW**

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